Team spirit is often suggested as a counter-balancing power to free-riding. Testing for team spirit with field data is difficult, however, due to an inherent identification problem. In this paper we use experimental methods to identify team spirit against potential confounding factors. In a team work task we vary subjects' information about relative team performance while we leave unchanged the structure of explicit incentives. We find that subjects contribute more to their team's project when teams observe each others' performance. We discriminate team spirit as implication of mutual peer pressure between teams as cause for this result.
Introduction "If one could enhance a common interest in nonshirking in the guise
of team loyalty or team spirit the team would be more efficient." Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 790) Team work can have important benefits. 1 However, as individual contributions to team output cannot be fully enforced, team work is susceptible to free-riding (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972) . Since free riding hampers productivity, firms can be expected to avoid team work whenever possible. Quite on the contrary, business organizations make heavy use of teams. For example, Osterman (1994) finds that 55 percent from a 1992 survey of American establishments employ teams. According to Lawler (2001) , even 72 percent of Fortune 1000 companies make use of work teams.
How can we explain that free riding in teams is not overwhelming? Modern work organizations commonly evaluate and reward teams according to the joint performance of team members. Yet, under standard economic assumptions these group incentives would have no effects to motivate workers (Kandel and Lazear 1992) . A way to circumvent the basic incentive problem is the use of competitive schemes which reward teams according to their relative output (Lazear and Rosen 1981) . Unfortunately, the implementation of the right relative scheme may be demanding. For instance, relative rewards may be inappropriate if contesting teams are asymmetric (Che and Gale 2003) , or they may not be feasible practically, for example, when there are adverse effects on work morale that foil the intentions of the management and sometimes even cause sanctions of peers against high performers (for a discussion see Che and Yoo 2001) .
In this discussion peer effects are often suggested to prevent excessive free riding and to explain why team compensation can lead to productivity improvements (e.g., Ichniowsky, 1 Such benefits arise, for instance, when there are efficiency gains due to knowledge transfer or specialization, or when the technology generates complementarities between the work of individuals. Prennushi 1997, Boning, Ichniowsky, and Shaw 2001) . There is now a growing number of theoretical studies which try to explain how peer effects possibly interplay with economic incentives (Kandel and Lazear 1992 , Barron and Gjerde 1997 , Che and Yoo 2001 , and Huck, Kübler, and Weibull 2001 . By peer effects this literature means that members of a team -apart from other motives -choose their efforts towards team production according to some standard set by peers.
Despite its importance, our knowledge about the empirical relevance of peer effects is limited. The reason for this is that peer effects are typical examples of social interactions who are generally difficult to identify at the presence of confounding factors (Manski 1993) . Such confounds arise, first, if it cannot be excluded whether members of a team join relevant individual characteristics. For example, teams may improve productivity regardless of peer pressure if highly skilled workers can self-select into teams and in this way signal their abilities relative to low skilled co-workers. A second source of confounds is that a team may be exposed to unobserved exogenous factors that influence people's behavior. This case would apply, for example, if teams improve the opportunities to monitor and sanction freeriders for purely organizational reasons (Knez and Simester 2001) .
In this paper we propose an experimental test for "team spirit". We define team spirit as Existing empirical studies have made important steps towards solving the identification problem with regard to peer effects (see Sacerdote 2001, Ichino and Maggi 2000, Kremer and  Levy 2003, and the literature cited by these authors). But these studies are not fully convincing due to an inherent impurity of field data. Recently, Falk and Ichino (2003) in field experiment to a great extent can exclude potential confounds. The main result is that in a work environment efforts of individual workers react on the observed output of other workers. Their study aims at assessing the existence of peer pressure between individual agents. In contrast, in our study we test for team spirit as an implication of peer pressure between teams. In Falk and Ichino (2003) another important difference with regard to our study is that subjects interact only once. In our study interaction is repeated.
We find that subjects exert more effort when teams can mutually compare each other's performance. We identify team spirit as cause for this finding: peer pressure induces higher contributions in team X whose members observe the output of team Y. If team Y can also observe team X, effects of peer pressure enforce each other and give rise to team spirit. We also observe that the effects of team spirit increase as the experiment proceeds and that low contributors are more sensitive to team spirit than high contributors are. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the experimental procedures. In section 3 we discuss our hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results and section 5 concludes.
Experimental Design
Subjects participate in a standard linear public goods game. This game constitutes a typical team dilemma, since every team member profits from the team output regardless of 
Hypotheses
By standard assumptions in economics no one should contribute to the team project in the last period. Since our experiment has a finite and known number of periods, by backward induction no one should contribute in any period. Our design leaves unchanged the incentives to contribute to the team project and this prediction applies independent of our treatment conditions.
A large number of experiments has revealed undeniable evidence that people exhibit substantial cooperativeness in typical public goods situations where cooperation is not supported by explicit incentives (Ledyard 1995) . To illustrate how we expect team spirit to operate in our design consider the following equations to describe subject i's contribution at period t: ω is a time-invariant type variable that captures differences in individual characteristics. By equation (2), we assume that a subject responds to other subjects' behavior on two accounts. First, with 0 / ) 1 (
, people contribute the more to their team's project the higher is the average contribution of the own team. This pattern of behavior is highly robust and known as "conditional cooperation" (see, Croson 1998 , Keser and van Winden 2000 , Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001 , Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter 2003 .
Second, we assume that others will affect a subject's behavior even if individual welfare is independent of the behavior of others, i.e., 0 / ) 1 (
. This effect accounts for peer pressure as discussed, e.g., by Falk and Ichino (2003) . Peer pressure will show to be an essential ingredient for team spirit to develop in our design. For this reason we formulate our first hypotheses with respect to peer pressure: 
, w h e r e X ω and Y ω denote the average type characteristic of subjects in the respective teams X and Y.
We can use these averages to illustrate a first implication of peer pressure. To simplify, for a moment we neglect the time index and calculate the differences between average contributions. This gives for treatment MUTUAL ) 1 /( ) ( ) (
, and
Consequently, for any value 0 > β the difference of average contributions between paired teams will be smaller in treatment MUTUAL than in the OBSERVER-OBSERVED condition.
Peer Pressure Hypothesis II: If peer pressure exists, the difference between average team contributions within a pair will be smaller in treatment MUTUAL than in the OBSERVER-OBSERVED condition.
We now turn to the notion of team spirit in our design. Inserting the expressions for average contributions of teams into equation (2) and iterating the time subscript one step further gives:
The same procedure applied for treatment BASE gives:
By comparison of (3a) and (3b) Treatment OBSERVER provides an essential tool to isolate team spirit in our design.
According to the above definition, team spirit will have weaker effects in treatment OBSERVER than MUTUAL. To see this, again insert (2) and account for the fact that in treatment OBSERVER a Y-team has no opportunity to observe an
. This gives:
OBSERVER:
Comparing equations (3a) and (3c) reveals that contributions will be higher in treatment MUTUAL. Intuitively, in the OBSERVER-OBSERVED condition, the chain of mutual reactions between X-and Y-teams is weaker because the observed Y-teams are not exposed to peer pressure from their paired X-teams. 4 We state this as: 
Experimental Results

Experiments were run between May and June 2002, at the Faculty of Social and
Economic Sciences at the University of Innsbruck. We conducted 9 experimental sessions with a total of 212 undergraduate students from various majors as participants. We had 72 subjects participating in MUTUAL, 64 in the mixed information treatments, i.e., 32 each in OBSERVED and OBSERVER; and 76 in BASE. The average subject earned € 8 (≈ US$ 8)
within approximately 30 minutes. The experiments were programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999 ).
Mutual observation:
We first compare treatments MUTUAL and BASE. Recall that the former provides information between paired teams into both directions: Team X sees how it performs relative to team Y, and vice versa. In contrast, the baseline does not comprise any information about another team (see Table 1 ). All tests are one-sided. We use as unit of observation the average contribution in independent teams or pairs of teams in BASE and all other treatments, respectively. Here, for instance, we have used mean contributions of 9 independent pairs of teams in MUTUAL and those of 19 independent teams in the BASE.
conditions than in MUTUAL except for one difference: people from the paired team do not observe the own team. Although the information is qualitatively the same, the difference is essential since it removes the possibility for mutually enforcing effects of peer pressure.
As can be seen form figure 2, contributions in MUTUAL tend to be higher than in OBSERVER. In the first block of rounds average contributions are 14.5 vs. 11.5 points (p = 0.134). A similar picture prevails in the second block of round (11.3 vs. 9.35 points; p = 0.168). To further explore potential effects of observing the figure also draws average contributions in treatment OBSERVED. There are no effects of observing in the first block of rounds (11.5 vs. 11.7 points in OBSERVED and OBSERVER, respectively; p = 0.5). In the second block of rounds contributions in OBSERVER slightly outstrip those in OBSERVED.
The differences are, however, not significant (9.4 vs. 7.4 points, p = 0.264). In line with our hypothesis regarding team spirit, we conclude that bilateral observation between teams has pronouncedly larger effects on contributions than just unilateral observation.
Effects of being observed:
Members of an OBSERVED-team operate under identical conditions than in BASE except for one difference: they know that another team observes their average team contributions and earnings. This fact may influence peoples behavior. For instance, some people are more likely to refrain from jaywalking or littering on the sidewalk when they are observed by others. The literature discusses such behavior, e.g., under the notion of esteem (Brennan and Pettit 2000) . We do not observe any such effect in our design.
In both blocks of rounds the difference between average contributions between treatments OBSERVED and BASE is negative and insignificant according to standard non-parametric tests (block 1: 11.7 vs. 13.3 points, p = 0.157; block 2: 7.4 vs. 8,5 points, p = 0.255). As a consequence, contributions in OBSERVED stay markedly behind those in MUTUAL (see, figure 2 ). Average contributions in these treatments are 11.7 vs. 14.5 points (p = 0.145), and 7.4 vs. 11.3 points (p = 0.034) in block 1 and 2, respectively. We conclude that the motivating effects of mutual observation cannot be reduced to single-sided effect of being observed. We summarize this discussion as: We state this as further result: According to equation (4), subjects contribute significantly more in period t the higher has been the average contribution excluding their own,
. This is consistent with findings from previous experimental research on conditional cooperation (for references, see section 3). The negative coefficient on variable t captures that cooperation decays as the experiment proceeds from one period to the next. Again, this finding is well established in the literature (Ledyard 1995) .
Regarding our treatments, the variables Observer, Observed, and Mutual are dummies that capture our treatment conditions. We find no evidence for effects of observing as compared to BASE: the coefficient of the variable Observer is negative and insignificant. The same result obtains for variable Observed. In contrast, as revealed by the coefficient on variable Mutual, the condition of mutual payoff observation is significantly associated with more contributions in treatment MUTUAL. This reaffirms our previous result 2.
Finally, if our second hypothesis regarding team spirit holds true, a subject i's contributions should respond more strongly to the past of average contributions it x ,... ,
following equation (5) shows the regression of contributions on first and twice lagged average contributions in these treatments. . With one time lag, contributions are positively associated with ; there is no effect of variable . This means that subjects in treatment MUTUAL are less sensitive to average contributions of the own team from the previous period. However, with two lags the coefficients on variables and , both, turn negative, i.e., in treatment MUTUAL subjects respond more strongly to past information about the observed team. In other words:
Result 4: In treatment MUTUAL, the effects of peer pressure and conditional cooperation gain momentum from period to the next.
Team spirit and types:
A final question we pose is whether different types respond differently to team spirit. We classify as "low contributors" those subjects who in period one of the experiment have contributed five points or less to the team project. In contrast, "high contributors" are those who in period one have contributed 15 points or more. 
Period
MUTUAL BASE
High Contributors
Not surprisingly, low contributors contribute less (coefficient = -7.9, p = 0.000) and high contributors more than all others (coefficient = 2.5, p = 0.028). Regarding the treatment effect, both low contributors (coefficient = 6.7, p = 0.001) and high contributors contribute 7 We abstain from calling low contributors "free riders", since conditionally cooperative types may not contribute if they hold a belief that others will not contribute.
more in treatment MUTUAL than in BASE (coefficient = 2.9, p = 0.034). Notice, however, from the coefficients that the treatment effect is more than twice as large for low than for high contributors. We summarize:
Result 5: Low contributors are more sensitive to team spirit than high contributors.
Conclusion
We test whether the opportunity of teams to compare each others' performance stirs a spirit of teams towards greater effort. We have argued that testing for team spirit is difficult in the field because it is hardly possible to find a setting in which the effects of both, endogenous and exogenous characteristics of a team can be controlled for simultaneously. To avoid this problem of identification we propose an experimental design in which team members contribute to independent team projects. Apart from varying the information regarding the relative team performance, the incentive structure is held constant across all treatments. By this means we disentangle the motivating effects of team spirit against alternative accounts.
The main result is that subjects contribute more to their team's project when they can observe relative team output. In contrast, we do not find enhanced contributions under conditions of unilaterally observing or being observed by another team. To explain these findings we provide a detailed account that team spirit is an implication of mutual peer pressure between teams. Our results 1 to 4 provide ample evidence that team spirit exists.
Team spirit evolves if the effects of peer pressure interact with those of conditional cooperation and enforce each other under conditions of mutual observation between teams.
Result 5 finally shows that team spirit motivates low contributors more than cooperative types of workers.
Our design is novel in various respects. First of all, a subjects' welfare is independent of relative team performance and there are no stakes for rivalry between teams. The paper, therefore, differs fundamentally from a growing number of studies about the motivating effects of tournament-based, competitive pay-schemes (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997), or the effects of between-group competition on within-group cooperation (for a survey see Bornstein 2003) . These studies impose incentives on individuals to compete between teams, removing the opportunity to isolate implicit motivating effects of team spirit. We also do not add anything to ease monitoring or sanctioning that could explain more cooperation in teams, for instance, due to a social norm of reciprocity (Carpenter and Matthews 2001) .
For the purpose of our study it is furthermore important that subjects are not provided with any clues which would allow for social identification of teams. The design ensures this by the use of neutral wording and complete anonymity of interactions. In this respect, our design is conceptually different from studies on in-and outgroup phenomena, which investigate whether and why people cooperate more with members of a socially identified ingroup (Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000, De Cremer and van Dijk 2002) .
Another important reason to keep all interaction anonymous is that this removes incentives to meet with social approval. For instance, in the setup of Falk and Ichino (2003) , although payment is independent of output, the possibility cannot be excluded that subjects fear social sanctions from the employer (i.e., the experimenter) if the own output negatively deviates from others'. Moreover, the authors find large effects on productivity in a treatment where workers can freely communicate in pairs. Such communication may have effects apart from pure peer pressure. In the laboratory we can exclude these confounds. Finally, in our study the team task is simple and subjects have complete knowledge about the quality of team production, i.e., learning does not apply to explain differences in team performance under varying information regarding another team.
Our study suggest that already a little information may go a long way, i.e. the public announcement of relative performance measures can trigger a spirit of teams towards greater efforts. In the introduction to this study we have pointed out that this finding is of great importance for practical as well as theoretical reasons. Finally, previous experimental studies by Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1993) Participants of this experiments are randomly assigned into groups of 4 members, i.e., there are three more persons forming a group together with you. The composition of groups will remain the same during the whole experiment, i.e. there will always be the same persons in your group. The identity of your group members will not be revealed to you at any time.
At the start of each period, each participant gets 20 points. We will refer to these points as your endowment. Your task is it to decide, how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to a project or to keep for yourself.
Your income consists of two parts:
(1) Points that you keep (2) Your "income from the project". This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0.4 × Sum of contributions of all group members to the project
The income of the other members of your group is determined in the same way, i.e. each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose, for example, that the total contributions to the project by all members in your group sum up to 60. In this case you and every other member of your group receives 0.4 × 60 = 24 points as income from the project. Suppose that you and the other 3 members of your group in total contribute only 10 points to the project. In this case every group member receives 0.4 × 10 = 4 points as income from the project.
For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one point. If you contribute that point to the project, instead, the sum of contributions to the project would rise by one point, and your income from the project would rise by 0.4 × 1 = 0.4 points. However, the income of the other group members would also rise by 0.4 points, such that the total income of the group would rise by 4 × 0.4 = 1.6 points. Your contribution to the project, therefore, raises the income of the other members of your group. On the other hand, you earn from each point that other members of your group contribute to the project. For each point that another group member contributes, you earn 0.4 × 1 = 0.4 points.
You take your choice via the computer. At the beginning of every period you see a decision screen:
In the area at the bottom you enter how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to the project.
The main area of the screen above consists of two parts:
On the left you find the information concerning your group. First you see your contribution of the previous period. Below you find the sum of contributions to the project of all members in your group.
The next line below shows your income of the previous period. Your income is determined as the sum of points that you have kept for yourself and the income from the project.
A bit further down you see the "average group income of all previous periods". This number shows the average income of your group added over all previous periods together.
Remark: In the first period (as here in the figure of the screen) there are no previous periods yet. For this reasons all numbers in the figure show zero yet.
On the right side of the screen you find information regarding another group. Just as you group, this other group consists of four participants. The four participants forming the other group will be the same during the whole experiment. The income of these four participants is determined in the same way as yours, i.e. all members of the other group decide how many of their 20 points they want to contribute to a project. The project of the other group is completely independent of your project.
The first line shows the sum of contributions to the project of all members in the other group. The second line a bit below shows the average income of the other group added over all previous periods.
Please note: Members of your and the other group mutually observe each other, i.e. the other group sees the same information regarding your group as you see regarding the other group.
After all participants have made their contributions a new period starts, in which you decide again how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to the project. In total there will be 20 periods.
